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5DIVIDING AND CONQUERING: 
THE DUALISTIC ROOTS OF 
ENVIRONMENTALISM AND ITS FOES
Corey Beals
IntroduCtIon —the dIsease
I was born with a disease. It was in my bloodstream before I was born, and it was in the food I ate, in the air I breathed, and the water I 
drank. Mine is a story of learning that I have a serious disease—an 
inherited disease made worse with addictive patterns of my own. It is 
a story of awakening to this fact and desiring healing and journeying 
toward recovery. But in order to tell this story of my addictive disease, 
I will need to tell not only how I got it, but also how it originated long 
before I was born, how it spread through our culture, and why it is so 
compelling. I also hope to suggest some possible ways of recovering 
from this addiction. 
The story of my disease is not a solitary story involving me alone. 
It is a story of people who developed this disease and gradually 
introduced it amongst their own people within several generations. 
The gradual introduction of the illness allowed one to live with it 
without dying from it. In fact, one of the strange effects of this disease 
was that those who had it thought that they were healthier than 
people who did not have this disease. So they were eager to spread it 
across the world. But when they introduced it suddenly to indigenous 
cultures that had never encountered it before, it killed them in large 
numbers. The disease I’m talking about is not smallpox. The disease I 
am talking about is dualism.
1. dualIsm defIned
Since the term dualism gets used in so many different ways and in 
so many different contexts, I will more precisely define the type of 
dualism to which I am referring. Dualism, as I will be using the term, 
takes as a premise what I will call the separability thesis, which has 
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roots in Descartes’ famous ‘separability argument’ regarding the body 
and soul (from the Descartes’ Sixth Meditation). In this paradigm-
changing work of philosophy, Descartes argued that if we could 
conceive of the body and soul as distinct from each other, then they 
must be independent substances (that is, separable). The argument 
says that if I can conceive of the mind without the body, or the body 
without the mind, then they are not identical. And if not identical, 
then they are separable substances. The unstated assumption at play 
in this argument, however, is what I am calling the separability thesis:
If two things are distinguishable, or distinct, then they are separable. 
By ‘separable,’ I mean that they can exist independently from each 
other as separate substances. The focus is usually on the question of 
whether or not these are distinct substances. But Descartes does not 
argue for the separability thesis; rather he argued from it. So while 
many critics of Descartes might point to his mind-body substance 
dualism as one of his worst contributions to culture, I would say it is 
the separability thesis. 
While presupposing the truth of the separability thesis—that if two 
are distinct, then they are separable—Descartes goes on to argue that 
the mind and body are distinct. He argues that since he can conceive of 
himself as a thinking thing even if he didn’t have a body, and because 
he can distinctly conceive of an extended body without having the 
capacity to think, those two things (mind and body) are distinct. He 
concludes his argument that because “I have a distinct idea of a body, 
insofar as it is merely an extended thing and not a thinking thing, it is 
certain that I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without 
it.”1 This last italicized phrase (italics mine) is where he slips in the 
separability thesis as if it were the most obvious truth in the world. 
But he does not argue for it. He argues from it. And nearly 500 years 
later, that one little phrase continues to shape Western culture as if 
it were unquestionably true. And this un-established assumption is 
required to make his argument work. A way of presenting the full 
argument (complete with the assumption) would be as follows.
1. If two entities are distinct, then they are separable (“can 
exist without each other”).
2. The mind and body are distinct from one another.
3. Therefore, the mind and body are separable.
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Most of those who reject Descartes’ dualism do so by rejecting 
premise (2) of the argument above. Such arguments might be 
motivated by the fact that they intuitively know that the conclusion 
(3) is false, so they reject premise (2). There are various ways of 
doing this that could all fall into the broad category of monism. 
Monism, in general, is the belief that all of reality is just one type of 
substance. The monists reject dualism by arguing that the mind and 
the body are the same thing. Three of the most notable forms of 
monism are materialism, idealism, and pantheism. Materialism argues 
that all of reality is just material, and that what appears to be mind is 
just reducible to material, and can be entirely explained in terms of 
material reality. Idealists, on the other hand, argue that all of reality 
can be reduced to ideas in the mind. Idealists explain that material 
reality only appears to exist as a separate substance, but that in reality, 
everything is just an idea—in the mind of God or in the mind of some 
other creature or collective set of creatures. These seem like opposite 
views, but they both are types of monism. A third type of monism is 
pantheism.2 This is the view that all things are one, whether it appears 
to be matter or mind, divine or human—it is all the same. There are no 
distinctions between divine and human or between mind and matter 
because everything is one, and everything—taken up together—is 
divine. While all three of these monist theories of ultimate reality are 
vastly different in many respects, they nonetheless share something 
significant in common. Each of these views challenges Descartes’ 
second line in the argument, and each of these view leaves the first, 
assumed line of his argument unchallenged. 
While dualism is a target of this essay—insofar as I hope to show 
the origins and consequences of dualism—the central player of this 
essay is the separability thesis. It is this separability thesis that I will 
suggest is at the root of much of our current ecological problems. 
Before looking further into the roots and consequences of dualism, 
though, it will be helpful to identify some examples of the many 
different forms that this separability dualism takes.
2. straIns of separaBIlIty dualIsm
One example of separability dualism is the dualism between land 
and humans. When I unknowingly lived as a human/land dualist I 
acted from the belief that because land and humans are different, I 
am entirely separable and independent from the land on which I live. 
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It did not matter where I was living—I was the same person wherever 
I was. Or so I thought. I acted as if how I treated the land I was 
living on or how it treated me were incidental to my existence. And 
since I thought that the place I was living and breathing was merely a 
secondary property of my existence, it did not occur to me that living 
in eight different places in twelve years had any significant bearing on 
who I was as a person. 
I was not necessarily an abuser of the land, but I definitely saw 
it as separable from me. I might avoid dumping gasoline on the 
ground—perhaps out of duty, but not because doing so would do any 
harm to me. I might be aware that clear-cutting a forest was harmful 
ecologically and aesthetically to the land. But the fact that this had any 
metaphysical impact on me as a person was foreign to me. 
This detachment from the land is made all the more acute by 
putting many layers of concrete, pavement, oil, steel and/or plastic 
between myself and the land. If I am sitting in a car, I am sitting on 
an oil-based plastic which is layered on top of several layers of steel, 
which is layered on some oil-based tires, which sit on top of on oil-
based pavement, which is layered on crushed gravel which may then 
be resting on bull-dozed soil that has removed any unique shape in 
favor of a flat surface. Dualism allows us to place many layers of artifice 
between ourselves and the soil, and those layers then create a state of 
detachment making it easier to further detach from the land. So it is 
easy to see how this disease can become more acute over time.
Another strain of separability dualism is individualism, which is 
a dualism between the self and the other. This is the view that just 
because a person is different or distinguishable from another human, 
he is thereby fundamentally separable and independent of that human. 
This human/human dualism is very similar to human/land dualism. 
And the symptoms are similar as well. Just as I can only mistreat the 
land if I think it is separable and independent from me, I can only 
mistreat another human if I think that the other human is separate and 
independent from myself.
In its earliest and most curable stages, this individualism is simply 
selfishness and self-centeredness. That form of individualism is so 
obviously immature and vicious that usually one can begin treating 
it simply by drawing attention to it. But the most dangerous forms 
of individualism are those that become disguised as scientific or 
philosophically sophisticated ideologies. 
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As I studied philosophical theories of the self, whether it was a self 
that was metaphysically grounded in freedom or in rationality or in 
will-to-power or even in creativity, these theories all were centered on 
the individual self. As attractive and noble as a theory of self based in 
freedom or rationality may have appeared to me, they each nonetheless 
were focused on an autonomous self. Any relational qualities in 
these theories came as secondary or tertiary properties of the self. 
The relation with the other was not constitutive of one’s core being. 
Relations with others—in the leading predominant philosophies I 
studied—always came as a secondary extension of the individual. But 
common to each of these views I tried on was the assumption that I 
was fundamentally distinct from others and was therefore separable 
from others metaphysically. 
3. the spread of dualIsm
It is hard to trace exactly how I discovered the ways in which I was 
deeply influenced by dualism. But somewhere in the process of looking 
to philosophy for ways to bring more integrity to how I perceived 
and lived life, many of the conversations I was reading began to 
ring false when it became clear that modern philosophy could not 
seem to connect being and doing or the individual and the other. 
Despite numerous attempts by brilliant philosophers to derive ethics 
from an ontology, none succeeded. Despite the attempt to show that 
ethical obligations to the other could be derived from individualistic 
accounts of the human being, all of them failed. So that left me 
with two apparent options. I could either keep trying to develop an 
ontology that entailed ethical responsibility for the other or I could 
admit defeat, and concede that since no ethical responsibility could be 
derived from an individualist account of the self, ethical responsibility 
must not exist as a true reality. The latter seemed ludicrous to me 
and assaulted my deepest intuitions, yet the idea of continuing 
the heretofore-unsuccessful search for an individualist account by 
being more intellectually rigorous than Kant and the rest of them 
seemed equally ludicrous. That is what led me to finally question the 
assumption that a theory of the self should assume an autonomous self 
that is separable from others. That is what prompted me to question 
assumptions that I had not even noticed as assumptions—assumptions 
common to my culture that I began to see were rooted in philosophies 
that had become widespread and commonplace centuries ago. My 
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dualism, to a large degree, was inherited. So I began to trace the 
genealogy of my disease. And while there was not a single individual, 
there were a few who were especially influential in introducing and 
spreading this dualistic disease. 
There were many philosophers/theorists who applied dualistic 
thinking to their respective fields of thought—Thomas Hobbes 
applying the dualism of self and other to political theory; Adam Smith 
applying the dualism of financial value and moral value to economics; 
Isaac Newton applying the dualism of Creator and creation to 
science, and Friedrich Schleiermacher applying the dualism of literal 
interpretation and metaphorical interpretation to hermeneutics. In a 
sense, each of these figures is considered a ‘father’ to his academic 
discipline, since the very idea of a discipline that is separable from 
other disciplines is another child of dualism. These divisions had a 
way of multiplying. But for the purpose of this paper I want to focus 
on another father of dualism who may have appeared earlier in the 
spread of this disease and had an influence on many of the dualisms 
that emerged later. That figure is Francis Bacon. He is often referred 
to as the father of the scientific method, and introduced multiple 
forms of dualism, not least of which was the dualism between efficient 
causality and final causality. Dualism nearly always was part of a larger 
sequence of events—dividing and conquering. While dualism divided 
two entities previously seen as inseparable, it nearly always followed 
that one of the two dyads would be embraced as superior and the 
other would be rejected—or at least neglected. 
Descartes divided body and mind, and then gave preference to 
the mind rejecting the validity of knowledge that was bodily. Hobbes 
divided the other from the self, and elevated the self above the 
other. After Smith divided moral value from financial value, he set 
financial value ‘free’ from any moral influence. After Bacon separated 
final causality (or questions of metaphysical purpose) from efficient 
causality (or questions of cause and effect), he blatantly dismissed 
questions of purpose elevating questions of cause and effect to a place 
of sole significance. Bacon was not unclear in the least that he was 
dispensing with any form of final causality, and reducing our account 
of knowledge to include only efficient causality. 
So it should come as no surprise to us that we find Bacon using 
the same strategy when it comes to the dualism of humans and nature. 
He sought to separate out humans from nature and then to elevate 
humans over and against nature. His goal was to use the efficient 
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causality (newly freed from final causality) to put Nature through a 
sort of Inquisition in which she was questioned in a controlled and 
constrained3 setting until she was forced to give up her secrets.4
And in practice, even if this was not the intent of any particular 
thinker who first proposed the separability, what seems to have 
happened historically in every example of a dualistically divided way 
of engaging a field of thought is that one or the other of the separated 
dyads becomes elevated as important while the other is either rejected 
or neglected. Divide and conquer. 
4. QuerIes 
Now that we have looked at dualism, specifically the separability thesis 
in which dualism is rooted, and a variety of ways in which this has 
been applied, I want to raise a few questions for our consideration.
1. How does the perception of separateness affect us? Perhaps 
it does not seem like a problem that we are metaphysically 
separable from God, others and the rest of creation. Is it 
worth considering the consequences of these dualistic 
separations on our relationship as humans with the rest of 
creation? If I view myself as different, yet deeply connected 
with all of creation, will that have a significant impact on how 
I relate to creation in contrast to viewing myself as entirely 
detached and separated from all of the rest of creation?
2. If the separability thesis is at the root of our ecological 
brokenness, then what is the way to heal this disease? Can 
it be solved by merely developing a new ethic? Can it be 
solved by merely developing a new hermeneutic? Can it be 
solved by merely developing a new theology? If the root of 
the disease is a metaphysical one, then it seems that the cure 
for the disease must also be a metaphysical one. Perhaps we 
do need a new ethic, a new hermeneutic and a new theology, 
but if these new theories are not rooted in a non-dualistic 
metaphysic, then will the new ethic, hermeneutic or theology 
be capable of treating anything more than the symptoms of 
the disease? What sort of metaphysical transformation must 
take place before the disease rooted in dualism is healed?
3. If we need a new metaphysical understanding of ourselves 
and our relationships with God, others and the rest of 
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creation, then how will that metaphysical transformation 
occur? We may do well to consider how the metaphysical 
transformation transpired at the hand of Descartes and 
Bacon. 
a. How did Descartes use a meditative discourse to change 
hearts? (Ironically, the meditation, which is a less 
argumentative genre and one that is aimed at taking 
both mind and heart on a journey together, was used to 
dismiss the validity of the heart in matters of knowledge.)
b. How did Bacon use an imaginative discourse to change 
the way people envisioned themselves and their world?
If we are sufficiently convinced of the inherent failure of the separability 
dualisms to understand, describe, and relate to God, others, and 
the rest of creation, then where do we go from here? Ironically, the 
philosophical/theological tradition that has predominated in the West 
over the last half millennium has also tended to answer that question 
in binary terms, assuming the separability thesis. The answer is either 
dualistic or monistic. We have been given two options: 1) We can 
embrace difference and be forced to accept separability, or 2) we can 
deny separability and be forced to deny difference. But is there a third 
option? What if we chose instead to reject the separability thesis and 
seek a metaphysical view that goes beyond the usual dichotomy of 
dualism and monism? Is it possible to embrace difference and reject 
separability at the same time? Is such a view logically and practically 
sound? 
I think such a space exists. What if such a third way is not only 
possible but is the best fit for describing reality? Might it be that this 
separability thesis has in fact led to the panoply of ecological crises we 
find ourselves facing after trying to deny a third way for so long? If we 
move beyond monistic and dualistic thinking to triadic thinking, what 
will result? We have given the other two options a full test; is it not 
time to accept the consequences of such thinking and try a third way?5
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view. But insofar as a pantheist holds that all of reality is part of one divine Being or one 
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 3.  Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, (1603). Transcribed from the 
1893 Cassell & Company edition by David Price. 
 4.  Carolyn Merchant, “The Scientific Revolution and The Death of Nature” Isis, 
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 5.  I intentionally end this with a query, since I do not have space here to address the 
question. I am currently writing a book for Baylor Press in which I am exploring triadic 
thinking as an alternative to monism and dualism. Hopefully, this question will inspire 
further discussion as we try to find our way out of the problems generated from monis-
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